Men's childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century by Allan Puur et al.
Demographic Research   a free, expedited, online journal 
of peer-reviewed research and commentary  
in the population sciences published by the  
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 







DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH  
 
VOLUME 19 ARTICLE 56, PAGES 1883-1912 




Research Article  
 
Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male 
role in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century 
 
Allan Puur 
Livia Sz. Oláh 
Mariam Irene Tazi-Preve 
Jürgen Dorbritz 
 
© 2008 Puur et al. 
 
This open-access work is published under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution NonCommercial License 2.0 Germany, which permits use, 
reproduction & distribution in  any medium for non-commercial purposes,  
provided the original author(s) and source are given credit.  
See http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/ 
 
 Table of Contents 
1 Introduction  1884 
    
2 Theoretical  perspectives  1885 
    
3  Data and analytical approach  1888 
3.1 Data  1888 
3.2  Main variables used in the analysis and statistical methods  1889 
    
4 Results  1893 
4.1  Expected and achieved number of children:  
descriptive analysis 
1893 
4.2  Fertility intentions and men's views of fatherhood:  
a multivariate analysis 
1897 
    
5  Discussion and concluding remarks  1900 
    
6 Acknowledgements  1902 
    
 References  1903 
    
 Appendix  1908 
 Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
research article 
http://www.demographic-research.org 1883 
                                                          
Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe  










The development of modern family patterns of the past decades has been accompanied 
by substantial changes in social norms, values and gender relations. There is theoretical 
support for the assumption that the persistence of low fertility levels across Europe is 
likely to be linked to the incomplete gender revolution, more specifically to the lack of, 
or only limited changes in the male gender role as opposed to the women’s role. In 
order to have a deeper understanding of the development of fertility, we aim to shed 
more light on the impact of men’s role orientation on their fertility intentions in this 
study. Our analyses include men aged 20-44 years in eight countries: Austria, Estonia, 
East Germany, West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands and Poland. The data 
are extracted from the Population Policy Acceptance Study of the early 2000s. 
Examining within-country differences, we find that men with egalitarian attitudes seem 
to have higher fertility aspirations than their traditional counterparts in contemporary 
Europe. This is supported by both the descriptive and the multivariate analyses. The 
picture is somewhat less conclusive though when we focus on country-rankings by 
intended family size and by the prevalence of egalitarian versus traditional attitudes.   
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1. Introduction 
Since the onset of the Second Demographic Transition in the 1960s, family patterns 
have changed substantially in Europe along with the norms and attitudes regarding 
family life and childbearing (Frejka et al. 2008). High marriage and birth rates at 
relatively young ages, as well as low divorce rates and rareness of non-traditional 
family forms belong to the past. The present, the early 21
st century shows a different 
picture. Fertility rates are below the replacement level, having declined in a number of 
countries to previously unimaginable lowest-low levels (Kohler, Billari, Ortega 2002). 
Postponement of, or even refrainment from parenthood, and the growing proportion of 
out-of-wedlock births are another important features of childbearing trends (Frejka, 
Sobotka 2008). Less committing forms of couple relationships, such as cohabitation 
and LAT-relationships, have become more and more common in the past decades. The 
prevalence of marriages decreased and they are formed at later ages, while divorce and 
separation rates, even among couples with children, increased dramatically. As a result, 
an ever-growing proportion of children have experiences of living with a single parent, 
usually the mother, or with a stepparent (Sobotka, Toulemon 2008).  
The development of modern family patterns has been accompanied by dramatic 
changes in gender relations, also known as the gender revolution (Goldscheider 2000). 
Women entered the public sphere, approaching participation rates of men in education, 
even at higher levels, and in the labour market. As their horizons expanded anticipating 
a long and continuous work life, and their bargaining position within the family 
improved, the role of the economic provider has become part of women’s identity 
(Goldin 2006). At the same time, there have been few signs from men’s side to acquire 
a share of family responsibilities, i.e. childcare and domestic tasks that would equal that 
of women (Bernhardt 2004; Neuwirth, Wernhart 2008). Thus, gender relations within 
the family have changed very little (Blossfeld, Drobnic 2001). This has led to 
incoherence in the levels of gender equity in what McDonald (2000) calls the 
individual-oriented institutions of the public sphere and family-oriented institutions of 
the private sphere. As a result, fertility declined and has remained at the present low 
levels. 
Substantial changes in norms and values have also facilitated the spread of new 
family patterns. Individualisation of the life course has opened the way for low fertility. 
As self-fulfilment and self-realisation have been increasingly emphasised, parenthood 
has become one of many possible but competing choices, which may be passed upon 
without any sanctions (van de Kaa 1987, 2004). Yet, the aim of self-realisation also 
allows for the increase of fertility levels, if the members of couples perceive parenthood 
to be compatible with their other goals and aspirations in the particular social context. 
These aspirations and the sense of their (in)compatibility with parental obligations are Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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closely linked to gender relations. Gender role attitudes, that also shape the sharing of 
tasks in the private sphere, are in turn likely to influence both individual aspirations and 
gender relations (Kaufman 2000; Bernhardt et. al 2008).  
Most research on modern demographic trends, especially fertility, and linked to 
that, on changes in norms and gender relations, has focused on women. However, if the 
development of fertility is to be understood, we need to study men as well, and not 
necessarily as member of a couple given modern partnership patterns as well as 
possible gender differences in parental and other aspirations (Greene, Biddlecom 2000; 
Neyer 2000). Aiming to predict reproductive trends better, fertility intentions are an 
important aspect to look at (Hagewen, Morgan 2005). There are differences among 
women and men in attaining such intentions as certain structural constraints weigh 
more heavily on women (Quesnel-Vallée, Morgan 2003). At the same time, studies 
have shown that men’s childbearing desires and intentions influence births in couples 
with equal force to that of women’s desires and intentions (Thomson et al. 1990; 
Thomson 1997; Thomson, Hoem 1998). As a recent analysis of data from the 
Eurobarometer 2006 demonstrated a strong positive relationship between ideal family 
size and egalitarian attitudes among young women in 25 European Union countries 
(Testa 2007), it is reasonable to assume that men’s fertility intentions and gender role 
attitudes are also associated.  
Thus, in the present article we aim to study the impact of men’s views on the male 
role on their childbearing desires in Europe at the dawn of the 21
st century, relying on a 
comparative research design. In the followings, we present the theoretical framework, 
and thereafter the empirical data and our analytical approach. The next section focuses 
on the results of the descriptive and the multivariate analyses. A discussion and 
concluding remarks round up the study.       
 
 
2. Theoretical perspectives  
A number of theories address the relationship between gender roles and fertility 
behaviour, and their logics may equally apply to childbearing intentions. First of all, 
much attention has been paid to women’s new role in the New-Home-Economics 
framework, frequently referred to in studies on fertility. A consequence of the new 
female role is women’s increasing economic independence, which has been seen as a 
main force of raising the cost of childbearing and thereby reducing fertility to its 
current low levels (Becker 1991). It is true, that the opportunity cost of women’s time 
spent on childcare was negligible in the traditional male-breadwinner model, which has 
been based on the gendered division of labour in the family, where men were the sole 
earners. This has changed as women increasingly sustained their labour-market Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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engagement even after marriage and the birth of a first child. Along with their rising 
educational level and thereby improved earning power, the cost of women’s time spent 
on other activities but paid work has multiplied in the past decades (Joshi 1998).  
However, as pointed out by Oppenheimer (1994), overlapping gender roles can 
also strengthen a family. In fact, it is role specialization that makes a family vulnerable, 
if the abilities of the adult partners to provide their particular contribution, i.e. earnings 
or care, diminish. Hence, low fertility levels are not an inevitable consequence of 
changes in the female role, but rather of the incomplete gender revolution, as suggested 
by McDonald (2000). According to his gender equity theory, fertility is low because the 
equal opportunities in education and employment for women and men have not been 
met by similarly equal rights and obligations for them within the family. Indeed, 
women continue to carry all, or nearly all, the burden of domestic responsibilities 
(childcare and household work). This, in turn, constrains their opportunities in the 
public sphere of life, as compared to men (Bernhardt 2004). To limit fertility is an 
option for the individual women to follow. In this way, they can minimize the negative 
effects of the lack of gender equality in the private sphere on their chances at the public 
domain. This reasoning also indicates that if men increase their engagement in family 
responsibilities to comparable levels with women’s, fertility is likely to increase. Thus, 
a change in the male role seems to be the missing piece in the fertility puzzle in the 
developed world, as women are obviously unlikely to give up their new roles and 
restrict their aspirations to the home (Blossfeld 1995; Blossfeld, Drobnic 2001). Also, 
the accomplishment of the gender revolution needs to be accompanied by a policy 
environment that facilitates the reconciliation of paid work and parenthood for both 
women and men, to keep fertility close to the replacement level (Hobson, Oláh 2006; 
Hoem 2008). 
What is the reason then of men being so slow to adopt new roles beyond that of 
the provider? According to the “doing gender”-approach, the allocation of women’s 
and men’s time to employment and domestic tasks is determined by the structure of 
work imperatives and the structure of normative expectations attached to particular 
tasks as gendered (Fenstermaker, West 2002). To engage in family responsibilities is 
considered as part of the feminine “nature”, whereas not to engage in them has been 
seen as part of the male identity. The gender division of work is determined by the 
gender system, constituted by common beliefs, norms and practices that define the 
meaning of being a man or a woman, as well as the rights and obligations of males and 
females (Mason 2001). Thus, the gender system is a social construction that will 
change only through long-term persistent accumulation of everyday challenges to it 
(Ridgeway, Correll 2004). Men, who increase their participation in family tasks to 
approach the share of women, challenge both the male and the female identities as 
defined by the gender system in a society. Such aspirations will be influenced then by Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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the support, or lack of it, men receive from their immediate family members and the 
community (Goldscheider 2000).   
It is easy to understand that men’s engagement in family responsibilities is likely 
to increase their partners’ childbearing desires. But what about their own fertility 
intentions, how will those be affected by the extension of men’s tasks? Taking men’s 
views on the ‘proper’ male role as a signal of their willingness to acquire 
responsibilities also in the private sphere, one may argue that having children is   
important for traditional men in as much as they confirm the male identity, and the 
tasks of active parenting are carried out by their wives, in line with the “doing gender” 
approach. For men with egalitarian views, the costs of children should be higher than 
for their traditional counterparts, as they will invest more time and energy in the care of 
their offsprings, which may reduce the number of children they desire. Yet, empirical 
evidence shows that egalitarian men are, in fact, less concerned with the costs of 
parenthood than traditional men. The main concern of the traditional group seems to be 
that children will limit their personal freedom, rather than the economic costs one could 
expect given their obligations as the sole or main earner in the family (Bernhardt, 
Goldscheider 2006). In line with this, the few empirical studies addressing men’s 
gender role attitudes and childbearing desires in the developed world suggest that 
egalitarian men are more, rather than less likely to intend to have a(nother) child 
compared to men with traditional views (Kaufman 2000; Tazi-Preve et. al. 2004). 
Clearly, egalitarian men appreciate the joy of fatherhood more than the latter group, 
probably because they are more interested in “doing family”, as Kaufman (2000) has 
put it, than in “doing gender”. Being more active participants in their children’s lives, 
they benefit from the relationship with them more directly than do traditional men, 
whose contacts with their offsprings are rather superficial. Also, traditional men may 
perceive children as “competitors” for their wives’ attention. They may be therefore 
less interested to have more than a very limited number of children. In contrast, 
egalitarian men are pro-family, which can increase their intended fertility. And finally, 
it might also be that more egalitarian husbands are more inclined to share domestic 
chores. 
The relationship between gender equity and childbearing however, does not 
necessarily follow a linear pattern. In a study on second births among dual-earner 
couples in the US, Torr and Short (2004) found that, at the individual level, the 
relationship between gender equity, as indicated by the division of housework, and 
fertility is U-shaped. “Modern” couples, who shared domestic tasks relatively equally, 
were the most likely to have another child. “Traditional” couples, where women did the 
bulk of the housework, also proceeded relatively quickly to a second birth. The 
probability to have a second child was lowest for the intermediate group, who might 
have to struggle most to balance work and family. In addition, a recent study on the link Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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between gender role attitudes and fertility among women in nine European countries 
also found some signs of non-linearity (Ruckdeschel 2008).   
Based on these theoretical and empirical considerations, our main hypothesis in 
this study is that men with egalitarian views have higher fertility aspirations than men 
with more traditional male role orientation. We are somewhat uncertain though of how 
this relationship may be modified by societal gender systems, in which the ideal of 
gender equality has been incorporated in varying degrees, if at all, in different 
countries. By the same token, we are not certain of the (non-)linearity of the 
relationship between gender equity and childbearing intentions. We expect that our 
comparative research design will help us to illuminate the mechanisms at stake. 
 
 
3. Data and analytical approach 
3.1 Data 
Our empirical analyses are based on data extracted from the Population Policy 
Acceptance Study (PPAS). This is a comparative research programme aimed at 
analyses of attitudes, opinions and practices on a broad range of population-related 
issues.
5 The Study addresses the perception of contemporary demographic trends, 
meaning of the family, advantages and disadvantages of having children, reconciliation 
of employment and parenthood, attitudes towards gender roles, the acceptance of 
various population policy measures and related topics. In addition, the programme aims 
to provide a knowledge base for constructing integrated population policies and to 
promote a dialogue between the general public, decision-makers and the research 
community.  
In the frame of the programme, quantitative surveys of national populations were 
carried out in 14 European countries — Austria, Belgium (Flanders), Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Romania and Slovenia — in 2000-2003, based on a common core 
questionnaire. The standardised microdata were later merged into the International 
Population Policy Acceptance Survey (IPPAS) database, suitable for comparative 
analyses. For all participant countries, the samples covered men and women in adult 
age groups. The basic characteristics of each national survey are reported in the 
Appendix (see Table I). 
 
5 The predecessor of PPAS is the PPA1, a study on population policy acceptance in the early 1990s (Moors, 
Palomba 1995, 1998). Compared to its follow-up, PPA1 was thematically more restricted and covered only 
seven countries.  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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With support from the European Commission under the Fifth Framework 
Programme, the partner institutes from participant countries formed a consortium, 
coordinated by the Federal Institute for Population Research in Germany.
  6 The 
analyses produced by the members of the consortium have been disseminated in a 
number of articles, working papers and conference papers. The main results have been 
published recently in a monograph edited by Höhn, Avramov and Kotowska (2008) in 
the series of European Population Studies. The volume provides a detailed account of 
the methodology of the programme. 
 
 
3.2 Main variables used in the analysis and statistical methods 
As mentioned, our empirical analysis on the relationship between the views on the male 
role and men's fertility intentions is based on the IPPAS data. The variables we use are 
derived from several modules of the database.  
Fertility intentions constitute our dependent variable, following a scheme, which 
has become rather common in demographically oriented surveys (Bongaarts 1990; van 
Peer 2002). In the PPA survey, respondents (with the exception of women aged 50 or 
over) were asked “Do you intend to have a(nother) child in the future?” (CF1). 
Alongside definite answers 'yes' and 'no', the questionnaire included a separate category 
of 'don't know/uncertain'.
7 Based on the results of an exploratory analysis, we decided 
to merge the latter category with the negative intentions. In case of a positive answer 
(i.e. ‘yes’), respondents were asked about the number of (additional) children they 
expect to have (CF1a). Based on these two items, ‘desired family size’
8 can be 
computed by adding the ‘number of children expected (additionally)’ to the ‘achieved 
parity’. In the following sections, both the intent for at least one additional child and the 
total number of children expected are used in the role of dependent variable. 
For the main independent variable, we rely on information from the gender 
module, which includes specialised batteries of questions about the attitudes towards 
sharing provider- as well as family roles between men and women. Several items of the 
module have been repeatedly used in other social surveys (e.g. World/European Value 
 
6 The DIALOG project 2002-2005 (“Population Policy Acceptance Study - The Viewpoint of Citizens and 
Policy Actors Regarding the Management” of Population Related Change“, no.HPSE-CT-2002-00153). 
Further information on the project and its outputs is available at the website of the Federal Institute for 
Population Research (http://www.bib-demographie.de/ppa/main.htm). 
7 On average, 17.3 percent of male respondents aged  20-44 years were not certain of their intentions whether  
to have a(nother) child in the future. The proportion is somewhat higher among childless men and decreases 
towards higher parity, except in Estonia and Lithuania. For all countries included in the analysis, the 
distribution is presented in the Appendix (Table II). 
8 The measure is called also ’ultimately intended family size’ (see Testa 2007). Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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Survey, International Social Survey Programme). A general discussion of the PPAS 
gender module and analysis of gender role attitudes based on it is available from 
Philipov (2005, 2008). For the purposes of the present study, the following three 
questionnaire items pertaining to the role of men and fatherhood were applied: 
 
•  G2c. It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and 
the woman goes out to work. 
•  G2d. Family life often suffers because men concentrate too much on their 
work. 
•  G2e. For a man the job should be more important than the family. 
 
These items represent different aspects of gender role attitudes with regard to 
men.
9 The first statement addresses the acceptance of the reversal of male and female 
roles compared to the traditional breadwinner-homemaker model. The second statement 
focuses on the awareness about the negative consequences of men's insufficient 
involvement in family life. The third item relates to gender ideology and compares the 
relative importance of work and family from men's perspective.  
For each item, respondents were asked to express their acceptance or non-
acceptance. The answers were recorded on the five-grade Likert scale, where 1 stands 
for a strong agreement and 5 corresponds to a strong disagreement with a statement. 
The statements, with the exception of G2d, were presented so that higher values 
represent a greater support to a more symmetrical sharing of income provision and 
family responsibilities, as opposed to gender roles characteristic of the breadwinner-
homemaker model. It should be noted that these statements have a general, impersonal 
character. Thus, they are to a smaller extent influenced by the diversity of life 
situations, which allows for better comparability across population groups. Moreover, 
general attitudes are less likely to be biased, than are personal attitudes, towards social 
desirability (Turner, Martin 1984; Hakim 2005). The frequency distributions of the 
selected items are presented in the Appendix (see Table III).  
In constructing an independent variable, we attempted to synthesise the above 
dimensions of the male role attitudes. In doing so, responses to the three questionnaire 
items (G2c-G2e) have been summarised into a composite index. The minimal score on 
the index is 3 points, which means that respondents have expressed their strong 
agreement with a separation of women's and men's roles in all statements.
10 The 
 
9 In the exploratory stage, we run analyses also for items pertaining to female role. The results are not reported 
here given the focus of the article on fathers.  
10 In order to allow for consistent aggregation of individual items into composite indices, the scale of G2d has 
been reversed. The values of Cronbach's alphas are for Austria 0.27, Estonia 0.16, East Germany 0.30, West 
Germany 0.30, Italy 0.42, Lithuania 0.07, the Netherlands 0.34, and Poland 0.09. Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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maximum score on the index accounts for 15 points, which represents complete 
disagreement with the traditional split of gender roles on all counts.  
The analysis presented in the following sections draws on the PPAS data from 
eight countries — Austria, Estonia, East Germany, West Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the 
Netherlands, and Poland.
11 East and West Germany are treated as separate states given 
noticeable within-country variation if analysed together. We focus on men aged 20-44 
years, whose childbearing decisions are of great importance for contemporary fertility 
levels in Europe. Given the set of countries and the age range, a working sample 
comprising 5,435 men was formed. In a preliminary analysis, we also experimented 
with a sub-sample of men currently in partnership but as this specification added 
nothing substantive to the results, these models are not presented here. The data used 
throughout the analyses are weighed to account for the sampling schemes applied in 
national surveys.  
In the working sample, the male role index revealed a fairly symmetrical spread of 
attitudes that resembles normal distribution. In other words, the index captures a 
considerable amount of variation in the attitudes of men towards gender roles and 
fatherhood. Taking into account findings from other studies, discussed in our theory 
section (e.g. Torr and Short 2004; Ruckdeschel 2008), also a categorised version of the 
independent variable was developed, based on the cumulative agreement or 
disagreement with different role models.
12 On the one hand, the prevailing acceptance 
of a strict segregation between men's and women's roles was classified as traditional 
orientation. On the other hand, strong support to more symmetrical division of roles 
and greater involvement of men in the family was classified as egalitarian orientation. 
Respondents, who were neither strongly for the separation of men's and women's roles, 
nor strongly against it, were included in the residual category of intermediate 
orientation. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of men aged 20-44 years by their role orientation. 
The data reveal noticeable differences between the countries included in the analysis. 
Not surprisingly, the pattern of cross-country variation indicates that traditional 
attitudes have a stronger hold in countries with persistent influence of Catholicism. 
Judging from the mean score of the index, the adherence to traditional views is the most 
prevalent among Lithuanian men, followed by Poles and Italians. In contrast, the 
 
11 Belgium and the Czech Republic did not implement gender module in their national surveys. Cyprus 
Finland and Slovenia did not implement the questionnaire items pertaining to male roles. The Romanian 
survey missed the number of already born children which prevented the calculation of desired fertility 
measures. Hungary was excluded due to frequent occurrence of missing data for the dependent variable 
among male respondents.  
12 The cut-off levels applied in defining the categories were the same for all countries. The respondents were 
classified as having egalitarian attitudes if they scored at least 12 points. If they scored 8 points or less, they 
were classified as having traditional views. Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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Netherlands and Austria rank highest with respect to egalitarian attitudes. In these 
countries, more than two fifths of men were classified as having views supportive to 
more symmetrical division of gender roles and greater involvement of men in family 
responsibilities. Estonia, East Germany and West Germany hold intermediate positions. 
 
Table 1:  Distribution of men (%) aged 20-44 years according to  
male role orientation 
Country  Traditional Intermediate  Egalitarian Mean  score 
Austria  12.1 44.0 43.9 11.2 
Estonia 6.7 58.4 34.9 11.0 
East  Germany  15.3 52.5 32.2 10.6 
West  Germany  12.1 50.3 37.6 10.8 
Italy  24.8 47.3 27.9 10.4 
Lithuania  16.9 69.1 14.0  9.9 
The  Netherlands  5.2 44.2 50.6 11.4 
Poland  16.3 64.6 19.1 10.0 
 
Source: IPPAS database 
 
The reasons of this pattern will not be studied here. Instead, we turn our attention 
to our main topic, which is the association between these attitudes and fertility 
intentions. In the followings, we study the relationship first by descriptive methods, by 
comparing the desired number of children of men with traditional, intermediate and 
egalitarian views on gender roles. Thereafter, a series of multivariate logistic regression 
models are applied to examine the association between male role attitudes and the 
intention to have a(nother) child by controlling for the effects of other factors that are 
known to influence childbearing decisions (age, current parity, partnership status, 
educational attainment, labour market status). To reveal the influence of context-
specific factors, such as the gender system, on the relationship between desired fertility 
and male role orientation, the analysis is country-specific throughout. The details of 




4.1 Expected and achieved number of children: descriptive analysis 
Looking at the differences in fertility levels associated with attitudes towards the male 
role among men aged 20-44 years, one should keep in mind that this age range includes Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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men at very different stages of their family career. Young men in their early twenties 
are usually still childless or have just entered parenthood, while older men in their late 
thirties and early forties are about to finish their reproductive career. Also, the timing of 
childbearing varies significantly across different sub-groups of the population as well 
as countries. For these reasons, the number of children born is a less suitable measure 
for comparison. Thus, the analysis draws on the concept of desired fertility that merges 
the number of children already born and the number of children expected. As the 
expected number of children is anchored to a specific life situation of an individual, it 
may be considered more realistic than the ideal family size, the latter reflecting a 
normative context in which fertility intentions are formed and expressed (Hagewen, 
Morgan 2005). However, numerous studies have documented a tendency of desired 
fertility often substantially exceeding actual fertility in post-transitional settings. On the 
micro-level, this discrepancy may be explained by unrealistic optimism at early stages 
of the life course, which gradually decreases towards older age (Noack, Østby 2002). 
On the macro-level, explanations have pointed to the postponement of childbearing 
(Bongaarts 2001), alternatively to the lagged adjustment of childbearing preferences to 
contemporary fertility levels (Goldstein et al. 2003). 
Table 2 presents the average expected number of children for men aged 20-44 
years for the eight PPAS countries included in the analysis. As expected, the number 
universally exceeds the levels documented by period fertility measures (Council of 
Europe 2006). In addition, the data reveal a noticeable variation across the countries. 
The level of desired fertility is highest for Estonia, followed by Lithuania and Poland, 
where the expected number of children (slightly) exceeds the replacement level. 
Turning to the other end of the scale, the results resemble the findings of Goldstein et 
al. (2003) based on Eurobarometer surveys as desired fertility appears to be lowest, i.e. 
1.5-1.6 in German-speaking countries (Austria, East and West Germany). Italy and the 
Netherlands occupy an intermediate position with desired fertility slightly below 
replacement. The general profile of fertility intentions in the PPAS countries has been 
further analysed by van Peer and Rabusic (2008). Here, we address the variation 
according to the prevailing views on men's role. 
The results presented in Table 2 generally support the hypothesis that, in 
contemporary Europe, the acceptance of more symmetrical gender roles and men’s 
greater involvement in family life tends to be associated with higher levels of desired 
fertility. Starting with all parities combined, six countries out of eight display a pattern 
that fully meets this theoretical expectation. In Estonia, East and West Germany, Italy, 
Lithuania and Poland, men with egalitarian views desire the highest number of 
children, whereas those disfavouring men's greater involvement in family issues have 
the lowest fertility intentions. Unlike in other settings, the relationship between father 
role orientation and fertility is not completely linear in Austria and the Netherlands, as Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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intended fertility in the intermediate group slightly exceeds that of men with egalitarian 
role orientation. In any case, men with traditional views on fatherhood have the lowest 
number of children expected in all eight countries included in the analysis. 
Regarding the scale of difference in the expected number of children, egalitarian 
men exceed their more traditional counterparts by at least 25 per cent in six countries 
out of eight. The difference according to male role orientation is most pronounced in 
Germany, particularly in its western part, where the number of children expected by 
egalitarian men is nearly two-thirds (57 per cent) higher than among their counterparts 
with traditional orientation. In contrast, male role attitudes seem to have relatively 
modest influence in Italy and Poland (15 and 7 per cent differences respectively). In 
Austria, Estonia, Lithuania and the Netherlands, the scale of differences ranges 
between 26 and 34 per cent.  
From the methodological point of view, the concept of desired fertility has a 
shortcoming, as it combines behavioural outcomes (children already born) with 
intentions (children expected). For men aged 20-44 years in the PPAS countries, on 
average both components made an approximately equal contribution to the number of 
expected children. However, the second additive embeds uncertainty, and as noted 
earlier, the stated fertility intentions are only partially materialised in contemporary 
societies. Thus, the question may arise of whether the higher intentions declared by 
men who favour more active involvement in the family will be transformed into 
childbearing decisions, or remain aspirations with hardly noticeable differences in 
fertility outcomes between men with traditional versus egalitarian role orientation. 
Parity-specific data presented in Table 2 indicate that in most of the countries 
included in the analysis, the differences according to role orientation are, indeed, more 
pronounced among childless men, with the exception of Estonia and Lithuania, where 
the scale of difference appears somewhat greater among men with at least one child. 
For childless men, particularly large differences can be observed for East Germany and 
the Netherlands, where men with egalitarian views desire twice the number of children 
expected by their counterparts with traditional attitudes. 
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Table 2:  Expected number of children by male role orientation,  
men aged 20-44 years 
Country  Total  Male role orientation 
   Traditional  Intermediate  Egalitarian 
All parities      
Austria 1.60  1.29  1.66  1.62 
Estonia 2.33  1.95  2.27  2.52 
East Germany  1.50  1.20  1.47  1.70 
West Germany  1.56  1.11  1.53  1.74 
Italy 1.89  1.76  1.90  2.03 
Lithuania 2.20  2.00 2.16  2.59 
The Netherlands  1.92  1.42  1.96  1.90 
Poland 2.19  2.13  2.17  2.28 
Parity 0      
Austria 0.76  0.57  0.76  0.81 
Estonia 2.12  1.88  1.91  2.42 
East Germany  1.06  0.62  1.05  1.32 
West Germany  1.08  0.79  1.05  1.28 
Italy 1.75  1.62  1.73  1.95 
Lithuania 1.85  1.88 1.79 2.15 
The Netherlands  1.47  0.71  1.59  1.43 
Poland 1.49  1.30  1.43  1.76 
Parity 1+      
Austria 2.34  2.12  2.38  2.35 
Estonia 2.52  2.00  2.53  2.65 
East Germany  1.95  1.96  1.87  2.08 
West Germany  2.21  1.93  2.32  2.16 
Italy 2.11  2.00  2.16  2.12 
Lithuania 2.36  2.03 2.35 2.81 
The Netherlands  2.43  2.27  2.42  2.45 
Poland 2.62  2.60  2.59  2.72 
 
Source: IPPAS database Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
1896   http://www.demographic-research.org 
To elaborate our descriptive findings from another angle, Table 3 compares the 
number of children born and additionally expected by men aged 35-44 years with 
traditional, intermediate and egalitarian attitudes. Men in this age group are well 
advanced in their reproductive career, which reduces the influence of varying fertility 
timing and provides more conclusive evidence. Analysing the PPAS data, Philipov 
(2005, 2008) has demonstrated that egalitarian gender role attitudes are associated with 
higher educational attainment and hence a later entry into parenthood, which we take 
into account by focusing at this older age group.  
  
Table 3:  Number of children born and additionally expected, by male role 
orientation, for men aged 35-44 years 
Country  Children born  Children additionally expected 
 Traditional  Intermediate Egalitarian Traditional Intermediate  Egalitarian 
Austria 1.37  1.72  1.87  0.12  0.27  0.29 
Estonia 1.14  1.87  2.00  0.26  0.58  0.75 
East Germany  1.12  1.27  1.13  0.27  0.19  0.52 
West Germany  0.82  1.07  1.31  0.14  0.58  0.43 
Italy 1.25  1.24  1.47  0.55  0.64  0.54 
Lithuania 1.81  1.83  2.23  0.15  0.32  0.45 
The Netherlands  1.06  1.52  1.33  0.30  0.46  0.53 
Poland 1.85  2.07  2.26  0.41  0.40  0.37 
 
Source: IPPAS database 
 
Table 3 shows that a higher level of desired fertility among men favouring an 
active father role is definitely not limited to aspirations. On the contrary, as men in that 
age group had on average accomplished 70-85 per cent of their childbearing plans by 
the time of data collection, the considerable part of variation in desired fertility pertains 
to the number of children already born. In seven countries out of eight, men with 
traditional orientation show the lowest fertility among the three groups compared. The 
only exception is Italy, where the intermediate group has a marginally lower number of 
children. On the other hand, men with egalitarian views have the highest number of 
children already born in all countries except for East Germany and the Netherlands, 
where the intermediate group shows the highest fertility. Comparing men with 
traditional and egalitarian role orientations, we see that the latter group fathered a 
higher number of children in all countries in the analysis. This suggests that the 
differences observed in fertility intentions will be transformed into fertility outcomes.   Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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To sum up the descriptive results, the acceptance of more symmetrical gender 
roles and men’s greater involvement in the family tends to be associated with higher 
fertility, both in terms of intentions and behavioural outcomes. Although there are 
minor deviations from the described general pattern, and the strength of relationship 
varies across countries and subgroups of men, the association seems to be nearly 
universal, applying to all major regions of contemporary Europe, independently of 
gender systems and state support to working parents. Before the implications of these 
findings can be discussed, we study the relationship also in a multivariate framework. 
 
 
4.2 Fertility intentions and men's views of fatherhood: a multivariate analysis 
Before drawing conclusions based on the bivariate association between men's role 
orientations and desired fertility, it is important to check whether the relationship could 
be spurious. The effects of attitudes may be overstated in cross-tabulations, for 
example, because external factors simultaneously influence both attitudes and fertility. 
To address the issue, we estimate a series of binomial logistic regression models.  
Similarly to other studies on desired fertility, intention to have a(nother) child is 
our dependent variable, set to 1 if the respondent expected to have at least one 
(additional) child, and 0 if the opposite was the case. As mentioned above, uncertainty 
of childbearing plans is merged with negative intentions (coded 0), following a rather 
conservative approach in the operationalisation of fertility intentions.  
The male role index, discussed in the previous sections, is our main independent 
variable. It is operationalised in two ways, used alternately in the models. The first 
specification is based on the metric score of the index. In the alternative specification, a 
categorical covariate with three levels (traditional, intermediate and egalitarian) is used. 
Our control variables consist of a set of demographic and socio-economic 
characteristics, which are known to influence childbearing plans, such as age, current 
parity, partnership status, educational attainment and labour market status. As in the 
descriptive section, our working sample is limited to men aged 20-44 years (see Table 
IV in the Appendix for the distribution of respondents over the dependent, independent 
and control variables for all countries included in the analysis). 
The modelling strategy applied is straightforward. For both specifications of the 
key independent variable, i.e. the male role index, two sets of main effects models are 
fitted. The first set produces non-adjusted estimates for the effects of the independent 
variable, whereas estimates adjusted for the effects of control variables are obtained via 
the second set of models. To reveal the contextual variation in the relationship, the 
models are fitted separately for each country. The model estimates are presented in 
Table 4, which displays the main results from 32 country-specific models. In the table, Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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the modelling results are presented in terms of odds ratios with significance levels 
associated with them.  
In general, the multivariate analysis confirms the validity of findings obtained by 
descriptive methods. The model estimates reveal that, in the majority of countries, 
egalitarian attitudes tend to be associated with higher fertility intentions. After 
controlling for the influence of demographic and socio-economic variables, the overall 
effect, captured by the metric score of the index as independent variable, is statistically 
significant in five countries — Austria, East Germany, Italy, Lithuania and Poland. In 
the other countries, the effects associated with the score of the index do not reach the 
level of statistical significance, although the gradients remain marginally positive.  
 
Table 4:  Intention to have a(nother) child, men aged 20-44 years.  
Estimates of logistic regression models (odds ratios) 
Country Category  Non-adjusted  Adjusted 









































































*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, reference category 'traditional' is not shown in the table. 
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In a parallel set of models, we use a categorical specification of the main 
independent variable with three levels: traditional, intermediate and egalitarian (for 
which the cut-off points have been discussed earlier in the article). The estimates based 
on these models are also presented in Table 4. From the analytical point of view, this 
specification allows us to highlight some further details in the general pattern with 
respect to the shape of the relationship between men's role orientation and fertility 
intentions. The models reveal that the metric score failed to capture a statistically 
significant effect of male role attitudes in the Netherlands, due to the prevailing non-
linearity of the relationship. With our categorised independent variable, we see that 
egalitarian views make a statistically significant difference in the odds of having 
a(nother) child also in the Netherlands.  
Among the remaining countries, West Germany also displays the hypothesised 
effect but it fails to reach the level of statistical significance. Regarding Estonia, the 
positive and statistically significant effect displayed for the metric score of the index in 
the non-adjusted model disappears in the adjusted model. A closer examination reveals 
that this occurs mainly due to a strong correlation between the dependent and 
independent variables, and the age of the respondent.  
The main conclusion we can draw from the comparison of adjusted and non-
adjusted models is that the relationship between men's role orientation and fertility 
intentions is to a significant extent independent of age, parity, partnership status, 
educational attainment and labour market status.
13 Among the 16 pairs of models fitted, 
the effect ceased to be statistically significant only in one case when the controls were 
introduced. The persistence of the effects after the adjustment for control variables 
indicates that attitudes towards the male role have direct effects and that the association 
between attitudes and fertility intentions is not spurious due to a common association 
with the exogenous control variable.  
To sum up the findings with respect to contextual variation, the results of the 
multivariate modelling confirm that role orientation makes a noticeable difference in 
countries with persistent Catholic influence (Poland, Lithuania and Italy). In fact, after 
adjusting for the effects of control variables, Lithuanian men demonstrate the strongest 
effect of male role attitudes on fertility intentions. The relationship appears quite 
pronounced also in German-speaking countries. Within this group, the multivariate 
models revealed the strongest and statistically significant association in East Germany, 
followed by Austria. For West Germany, however, we find more modest effects, that 
do not reach the level of statistical significance whatever the model specification. This 
may be explained partly by the non-linearity of the relationship between men’s role 
orientation and the number of children additionally expected (see ‘parity 1+’ in Table 
 
13 The model estimates for control variables are not discussed here, but are presented in Table V in the 
Appendix.  Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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2) given that our models focus specifically on the latter component of desired fertility. 
Non-linearity of the relationship reduces the consistency of modelling results also for 
the Netherlands, as noted earlier, but the influence of egalitarian role orientation is 
similar to that in the countries discussed above. The pattern for Estonia is, however, 
less clear in the multivariate analysis. 
 
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
In this paper, we addressed the relationship between men’s views on the male role and 
their childbearing desires in contemporary Europe. Eight countries from all the major 
regions of Europe except for Scandinavia (given data limitations), where the societal 
gender system is the most egalitarian in the world, were included in the analysis. These 
eight societies are clearly different in respect to the prevalence of egalitarian versus 
traditional role orientation among men at ages 20-44 years, whose attitudes and fertility 
intentions we studied. The three countries with persistent influence of Catholicism, 
Lithuania, Poland and Italy have the smallest proportion of men with egalitarian views. 
The Netherlands with only 5 percent of men advocating traditional roles, along with 
Austria, where twice as many have such orientation, rank highest regarding egalitarian 
attitudes. In contrast, about one-third of the men in East- and West Germany and in 
Estonia support such views.   
First, we examined cross-country differences by the expected number of children, 
which is the sum of children already born and those planned (additionally). The former 
state socialist countries, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland show expectations slightly 
above the replacement level echoing birth rates achieved there up to the recent past, i.e. 
the early 1990s, unlike in other regions of Europe. The German-speaking countries, 
Austria, East and West Germany demonstrate the lowest expectations (about 1.5-1.6 
children), slightly exceeding their fertility levels of the past decades.
14 Italy and the 
Netherlands are located in-between with an expected family size of 1.9. We can not 
connect directly the ranking of countries by expected number of children and by the 
prevalence of egalitarian and/or traditional views among men in these societies, as the 
former seems to support the socialization argument linking the social context and 
family size desires as presented by Goldstein et al. (2003), while the latter points to the 
influence of other norms and values, especially for the Catholic societies. Indeed, in 
two of the four countries with the highest expected number of children we find the 
smallest proportion of men with traditional values and a high proportion of egalitarian 
 
14 Total fertility rates were though above that level in East Germany up until the late 1980s (Council of 
Europe 2006).  Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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men (Estonia and the Netherlands), whereas the other two countries (Lithuania and 
Poland) have top-ranking regarding the share of traditionally-oriented men and the 
smallest share of those with egalitarian views.  
We also looked at within-country differences by the expected number of children 
among men with different role orientations. We found that men with traditional 
attitudes have the lowest expected fertility in all the eight countries in the analysis. 
Distinguishing by parity revealed a similar picture with a few exceptions: among 
childless men in Lithuania, those with intermediate attitudes have the lowest 
expectation, followed by men with traditional views, and among fathers, such pattern 
applies to East Germany and Poland. In any case, comparing the expected family sizes 
of men with egalitarian and those with traditional views, we found that the latter desire 
fewer children than their egalitarian counterparts in these eight societies. Focusing on 
men aged 35-44 years, who have already realized 70-85 percent of their childbearing 
plans, we noticed the same pattern with egalitarian men having fathered a larger 
number of children compared to traditional men in all countries included in the 
analysis. 
Thereafter, we analyzed men’s intentions to have a(nother) child using logistic 
regression models. When we controlled for other factors known to influence 
childbearing plans, the categorical specification of role orientation revealed a 
significant positive relationship between egalitarian attitudes and fertility intentions in 
six out of the eight countries, with the same pattern displayed also for West Germany 
but not reaching statistical significance. Estonia was the only country with no apparent 
difference between egalitarian and traditional men’s fertility intentions.   
What conclusion can we draw based on these results? Overall, the findings seem 
to support the hypothesis that men with egalitarian views have higher fertility 
aspirations than men with traditional role orientation in contemporary Europe. This was 
confirmed by both the descriptive and the multivariate analyses, as seen for within-
country differences, both for childless men and for fathers. In addition, we found that 
egalitarian men not only desire a higher number of children, but they also realize these 
plans by their late 30s and early- and mid-40s, fathering more children on average than 
do traditional men. At the same time, when it comes to cross-country differences, we 
could not detect a direct link between country rankings by the expected number of 
children and by the prevalence of egalitarian versus traditional attitudes in the different 
countries. However, macro- and micro-level relationships do not always coincide, as 
seen for example for the association between female employment and fertility.
15 The 
conclusion of this study is then that egalitarian men seem to be pro-family indeed, 
 
15 A positive relationship between female employment and fertility was noticed from the late 1980s onwards 
at the macro-level (Ahn, Mira 2002; Castles 2003), whereas non-employed women were frequently shown to 
have higher fertility than women in career (Hakim 2003). Puur et al.: Men’s childbearing desires and views of the male role in Europe 
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notwithstanding the lack of correspondence in country-rankings by attitudes and by 
family size. Egalitarian men are clearly interested in “doing family” rather than in 
“doing gender”, as suggested by Kaufman (2000). In the long run, this may indicate 
some positive prospects for Europe’s fertility development, depending on the 
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Appendix 
Table I:  Basic characteristics of PPAS surveys 
Country  Survey year  Age range  Sample size  Working sample size 
(men 20-44) 
Austria 2001  20-65  2000  616 
Belgium (Flanders)  2003  20-65  3957  — 
Czech Republic  2001  18-75  1073  — 
Estonia 2003  17-79  1681  245 
Finland 2002  18-69  3806  — 
East Germany  2003  20-65  2052  525 
West Germany  2003  20-65  2058  583 
Hungary 2000  18+  3057  — 
Italy 2002  20-50  3500  1446 
Lithuania 2001  18-75  1400  343 
The Netherlands  2002  16+  1989  473 
Poland 2001  18-65  4653  1204 
Romania 2001  18+  1556  — 
Slovenia 2000  20-65  1550  — 
Cyprus 2001  18-59  1163  — 
 
Source: IPPAS database Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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Table II:  Intention to have a(nother) child, men aged 20-44 (%)  








All parities          
    Yes  48.0 45.5 29.6 31.8 58.1 33.8 39.5 28.7 
    No  52.0 28.1 51.7 46.8 34.4 40.6 40.4 40.8 
  Don't know, uncertain  0.0  26.4  18.7  21.4  7.5  25.4  20.1  30.5 
    Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Parity 0 
        
    Yes  75.0 76.0 43.5 39.3 79.3 68.6 51.8 46.0 
    No  25.0  6.0 32.4 33.7 12.7 11.8 24.5 15.8 
  Don't know, uncertain  0.0  18.0  24.1  27.0  8.0  19.6  23.7  38.2 
    Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Parity 1+          
    Yes  23.9 24.5 13.0 19.6 27.5 19.0 22.5 15.5 
    No  76.1 43.3 74.8 67.6 65.5 53.2 62.5 59.8 
  Don't know, uncertain  0.0  32.2  12.2  12.8  7.0  27.8  15.0  24.7 
    Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Source: IPPAS database 
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Table III:  Items included in the male role index, men aged 20-44 (%)  




Italy Lithuania  The  Nether-
lands 
Poland 
G2C. It is not good if the man stays at home and cares for the children and the woman goes out to work 
Strongly  agree  16.6 16.3 11.6  9.0 16.2  13.1  2.5  12.9 
Agree  13.7 23.3 17.4 17.0 23.9  30.6  6.7  33.2 
Neither agree nor disagree  21.7  30.0  30.9  30.5  n.a.  32.1  17.0  30.9 
Disagree  24.1 20.8 21.0 26.3 31  21.6  42.2  20.2 
Strongly  disagree  23.9  9.6 19.1 17.2 28.9 2.6  31.6  2.8 
Total  100 100 100 100 100  100  100  100 
G2D. Family life often suffers because men concentrate too much on their work 
Strongly  agree  17.9 27.2  8.6 11.2 21.8 6.7  3.0  9.7 
Agree  50.1 58.0 43.5 50.9 51.5  47.5  37.3  47.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  17.7  10.7  28.1  23.4  n.a.  30.0  32.1  26.5 
Disagree  10.2  3.3 15.6 10.4 19.0  14.6  24.9  13.8 
Strongly  disagree  4.1 0.8 4.2 4.1 7.7  1.2  2.7  2.2 
Total  100 100 100 100 100  100  100  100 
G2E. For a man the job should be more important than the family 
Strongly  agree  0.5 1.2 1.3 2.1 9.7  1.7  1.0  1.7 
Agree  3.6 3.3 5.5 6.0  27.9  5.8  1.0  4.8 
Neither agree nor disagree  17.1  14.4  19.1  18.6  n.a.  20.7  11.4  16.9 
Disagree  30.7 48.6 35.9 33.3 30.1  60.7  34.3  55.5 
Strongly  disagree  48.1 32.5 38.2 40.0 32.3  11.1  52.3  21.1 
Total  100 100 100 100 100  100  100  100 
 
Source: IPPAS database Demographic Research: Volume 19, Article 56 
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Table IV:  Descriptive statistics of control variables used in logistic regression 
models, men aged 20-44 (%) 




Italy Lithuania  The  Nether 
lands 
Poland 
Age               
Mean age (years)  32.8  32.6  33.9  33.2  32.1  33.3  33.5  31.8 
Educational attainment               
Primary or lower secondary 
education 
6.7 11.8  5.2  9.7  26.3  5.8  20.6 15.0 
Upper secondary or non-
university education 
85.6 68.6  73.7  60.7  63.1  77.6  54.7 77.8 
University education  7.7  19.6  21.1  29.6  10.6  16.6  24.7  7.2 
Total  100 100  100  100  100  100  100 100 
Labour market status               
Full-time  84.9 80  66.1  78 75.2  67.1  81.9 69 
Part-time  4.4 4.1  4.2  3.8  4.1  7.6  9.3 4.3 
Not  employed  10.7 15.9  29.7  18.2  20.7  25.3  8.8 26.7 
Total  100 100  100  100  100  100  100 100 
Number of children               
Childless  46.6 41.6  53.9  62.0  59.2  29.7  57.8 43.7 
One  child  14.3 20.0  20.5  14.3  18.5  22.2  11.4 16.1 
Two+  children  39.1 38.4  25.6  23.7  22.3  48.1  30.8 40.2 
Total  100 100  100  100  100  100  100 100 
Partnership status               
With  partner  68.0 67.8  61.7  60.7  72.5  78.7  72.7 62.2 
No  partner  32.0 32.2  38.3  39.3  27.5  21.3  27.3 37.8 
Total  100 100  100  100  100  100  100 100 
 
Source: IPPAS database 
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Table V:  Intention to have a(nother) child, men aged 20-44. Estimates of 
logistic regression models for control variables (odds ratios) 




Italy Lithuania  The  Nether 
lands 
Poland 
  Independent variable: male role index (3 levels) 
Age  0.90*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.92*** 0.90*** 0.81*** 0.80* 0.86*** 
Educational attainment             
Primary or lower secondary 
education 
0.76 0.69 0.35* 1.47  0.72** 0.39*** 0.65 1.04 
Upper secondary or non-
university educationa 
1.00 1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 
University education  1.22  1.31  1.53  1.20  1.36  1.65  0.96  1.76* 
Labour market status             
Full-timea 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Part-time 0.45  0.85  0.51  1.62  0.67  2.51  1.42  0.32** 
Not employed  1.18  0.71  1.02  1.67* 0.87 0.92  0.06*** 0.69** 
Number of children             
Childless 15.0*** 9.82*** 4.28 4.09*** 43.1*** 9.36*** 2.66** 11.7*** 
One child  7.34*** 4.39*** 1.01 3.82*** 15.7*** 5.88*** 6.48*** 4.03*** 
Two+ childrena 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Partnership status             
With partner  1.66* 1.22  2.98  2.32*** 2.81*** 1.78 0.73  4.35*** 
No par nera  t 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00   
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p a reference category  <0.1, 
Source: IPPAS database 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  